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S/1994/976
17 August 1994

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Items 71 and 151 of the provisional agenda*
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF CROATIA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 17 August 1994 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with instructions from my Government, I most strongly protest the practice by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to promote the positions of the representatives of the so-called "Republic of Serb Krajina", in the occupied territory of Croatia, in the documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council, and in the press releases of the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), distributed on the premises of the United Nations Headquarters.

Most recently, the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia distributed press release promulgating letters from the self-styled "president" and the self-styled "foreign minister" of the so-called "Republic of Serb Krajina" (see releases 13/8 and 15/8 of 15 and 16 August 1994 respectively). The said self-proclaimed officials have carried out hostile activities against Croatia and its citizens, for which some of them must be brought before the International Court of Justice at The Hague. These and other "officials" of the so-called "Republic of Serb Krajina" have publicly voiced positions which represent open attacks against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Croatia.

The promotion of political views of the self-styled leadership in the occupied territories of Croatia is just one in the series of secessionist activities promoted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

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* A/49/150.

(Serbia and Montenegro) in favour of their proxies in the occupied territories of Croatia. My Government has already informed the Security Council in a letter dated 19 May 1994 (S/1994/595) about other secessionists activities by the self-styled leadership in the occupied territories of Croatia supported by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

Further in this regard, the relevant authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) last month graduated a military officers class, trained in Belgrade, whose members have been assigned to the occupied territories of Croatia, and made plans to open a branch of the Belgrade University, with a curriculum of the Republic of Serbia, in Vukovar, on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, occupied by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

In this way, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has flagrantly violated the generally accepted principles of international relations and behaviour between States, the Charter of the United Nations, the documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and all relevant Security Council resolutions.

These aforementioned overt acts of uninterrupted active assistance and direct support to the secessionists and separatists in the occupied territories of Croatia, and their policies, are further proof that the Belgrade regime - either directly or through proxies - still behaves as the occupying force on certain parts of the sovereign Croatian territory, and appears to have every intention to continue to do so in the future. These policies become even more ominous in the light of the refusal of the Belgrade authorities to exchange the documents on mutual recognition with neighbouring States as called for in, inter alia, the communiqué of the Group of Seven meeting at Naples.

On a number of occasions, Croatia has pointed out, with grave concern, to the far-reaching negative consequences of such a policy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for stability in the region. Despite its assurances to the contrary, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has interfered, in the most direct and blatant way, into the internal affairs of Croatia, which reserves the right to make appropriate conclusions from such a policy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

May I request your kind assistance in distributing this letter as a document of the General Assembly, under items 71 and 151 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladimir DROBNJAK
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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S/1994/977
17 August 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON SOMALIA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In my previous report to the Security Council (S/1994/839), I informed the Council that I had asked my Special Representative to prepare an in-depth assessment of the prospects for national reconciliation in Somalia. I also said that I had decided to undertake a comprehensive review of the current troop strength of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) and would dispatch a special mission to discuss with the Special Representative and the Force Commander the extent of a reduction in the level of troops currently assigned to UNOSOM II, and to present specific recommendations to me.

2. The purpose of the present report is to apprise the Security Council of the outcome of these initiatives and to present to it recommendations on action to be taken during the period preceding the expiry of UNOSOM II's current mandate on 30 September 1994. Section II of the report contains an assessment of the prospects for national reconciliation. Section III discusses the feasibility of commencing a reduction in the level of troops while paying special attention to the views of the humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) active in Somalia and the essential tasks of ensuring the security of UNOSOM II personnel and humanitarian assistance programmes and personnel. The last section contains my observations and recommendations.

II. PROSPECTS FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

3. A durable political settlement remains the indispensable prerequisite for restoring peace and security, re-establishing central governmental structures and services, and commencing the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction of the economic and social infrastructures of Somalia. I have repeatedly expressed concern that the national reconciliation process is advancing at too slow a pace and that progress achieved in the rebuilding of institutions, especially the police and the judicial system, cannot be consolidated until the many factions in Somalia, and especially their leaders, decide to work seriously together to reach a durable political settlement. In my previous report, I reiterated my call upon the Somali political leaders to redouble their efforts to reach agreement on the basis of pluralism and mutual tolerance so that the

international community could regain confidence that it would be able to complete its mission in Somalia by March 1995.

4. The Security Council is aware that since the beginning of 1993 two major conferences have been held with the assistance and support of the United Nations in an effort to advance the peace process and to facilitate national reconciliation and unity. In the Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993, the 15 Somali factions agreed on a cease-fire and disarmament and on transitional arrangements leading to the establishment of a Transitional National Council. While some progress has been registered at the local and regional levels in the implementation of this Agreement, repeated violations of the cease-fire and lack of progress in disarmament, as well as factional disputes, inter-clan rivalries and conflicts have made it impossible to proceed with the establishment of a central administrative mechanism.

5. In an attempt to reactivate the process, the 15 signatories to the Addis Ababa Agreement adopted on 24 March 1994 the Nairobi Declaration in which they agreed, among other things, on the convening of a national reconciliation conference, to be preceded by a preparatory meeting, with a view to establishing an interim government. Ongoing factional disputes and conflicts and disagreements concerning modalities have made it impossible thus far to reach agreement on the date and venue for the preparatory meeting, which was originally scheduled for 15 April 1994. Consequently, the national reconciliation conference that was scheduled to take place on 15 May 1994 has been indefinitely postponed.

6. In addition to these efforts at the national level, inter-clan reconciliation meetings at the local, district and regional levels have also been sponsored by the United Nations to move forward the peace process. These include the Galkayo meeting (June 1993), the Jubaland peace conference (June-August 1993), the Lower Juba region Reconciliation Conference (Kismayo, June 1994) and the Absame Reconciliation Conference (Dobley, June-July 1994), as well as several other local and regional initiatives and conferences, including those by the Imam of Hirab with respect to the situation in Mogadishu. Taken together, these meetings have enhanced the prospects for national reconciliation.

7. It is now generally acknowledged that conflicts within the dominant Hawiye clan, to which both Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Mohammed Farah Aidid belong, constitute the major obstacle to national reconciliation. It is equally recognized that no meaningful progress can be made in the political process without first finding a solution to the conflict in Mogadishu, and in particular the conflict among the Hawiye sub-clans (Habr Gedir, Abgal, Hawadle and Murosade). The root causes of dissension and tension among the 15 factions are also by and large attributable to rivalries within the Hawiye clan. The recent hostilities in Merka, Mogadishu, Belet Weyne, Jalalaxi and the Lower Juba region are manifestations of this fact. If Hawiye reconciliation could be attained and the differences resolved between Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid, the prospects for national reconciliation and the establishment of a national government would be significantly improved. Both General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi have expressed their willingness to participate in a Hawiye reconciliation conference with the cooperation of other concerned factions and political leaders.

8. It is the view of my Special Representative that with the cooperation of the parties concerned and the support of the international community, the reconciliation of the Hawiye should be achieved in good time to create a favourable climate for the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and the establishment of an interim government in the last quarter of 1994. This would leave three months for consolidating agreed transitional arrangements for the interim government before the completion of the mission of UNOSOM II at the end of March 1995. While the international community obviously supports the attainment of this objective, it is for the Somali people as a whole to make every effort to achieve a comprehensive cessation of hostilities and to establish and consolidate an interim government before UNOSOM II completes its mission.

9. I am inclined to agree with the assessment of my Special Representative that the successful conclusion of the Hawiye conference would greatly facilitate the political reconciliation process. It was the intra-Hawiye feud that started the crisis in Mogadishu and its environs in 1991 and has been the main cause of the resumption of fighting since June 1994.

10. There are, however, no clear signs that preparations for a Hawiye conference are under way. In addition, it has been learnt that it takes a long time in Somalia to convene such meetings and bring them to a successful conclusion. In this instance, in particular, the convening of a successful conference by the end of September 1994 would necessitate major changes of approach from the principal actors. I have nevertheless instructed my Special Representative to provide all possible support to the efforts deployed by the parties concerned to convene a Hawiye conference in the next few weeks.

III. POSSIBLE REDUCTION IN THE UNOSOM II FORCE

11. The Special Mission which I dispatched to Somalia to discuss with my Special Representative and the Force Commander the feasibility of a reduction in the Force's level arrived in Mogadishu on 28 July 1994 and remained in Somalia until 4 August 1994. It was headed by Major-General Timothy Dibuama and included Ms. Elisabeth Lindenmayer, Principal Officer, Department of Peace-Keeping Operations and Mr. Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Department of Political Affairs. The Mission had lengthy and detailed discussions with my Special Representative, Mr. James V. Gbeho; the Force Commander, General Abooh Samah Bin Abu Bakar; and other senior civilian and military officials of UNOSOM II. The Special Mission also received extensive briefings by the Indian Brigade at Baidoa and Kismayo. At Mogadishu and Kismayo, the Mission met with representatives of United Nations agencies, humanitarian organizations and NGOs.

12. In the Special Mission's discussions with my Special Representative and the Force Commander, a consensus was reached to reduce the UNOSOM II Force to about 17,200 all ranks by the end of September 1994. The Force's current authorized strength is 22,000 all ranks and the actual strength on 2 August 1994 was 18,761. The proposed reduction thus represents some 8 per cent of the actual strength but would bring the Force to a level 21.8 per cent below its authorized strength. The Force would continue to perform the tasks assigned to it under

its current mandate as provided for in Security Council resolution 897 (1994). These tasks include protection of major seaports and airports, providing security for humanitarian assistance operations, for UNOSOM II and support personnel and for installations and equipment of the United Nations and its agencies, as well as assisting in the re-establishment of the Somali police and judicial system.

13. The discussions at Mogadishu between the Special Mission and UNOSOM II also focused on the vital need to sustain, to the extent possible, the progress achieved in promoting stability in the regions. In many areas, appreciable progress has been made in negotiating regional agreements, training police units and initiating judicial arrangements, particularly in the regions referred to in paragraph 6 above. The support provided by the presence of military personnel of UNOSOM II has been a central factor in this regard, and the Special Mission concluded that any reduction should be at a pace that does not lead to a deterioration in security conditions.

14. In discussions with the Special Mission, representatives of humanitarian organizations expressed concern about the possible precipitous withdrawal of UNOSOM II troops from key regions in which they were currently operating. In order to be able to continue their activities, the humanitarian organizations consider it essential that the troops continue to provide security at key installations such as the airports and seaports at Mogadishu and Kismayo and the airport at Baidoa; escort relief convoys to selected destinations in the interior on a regular basis; provide protection for premises used by United Nations agencies and NGOs; and maintain adequate capabilities for emergency response and evacuation by helicopter. The critical nature of the security role being played by UNOSOM II troops, particularly outside Mogadishu, was emphasized by the representatives of humanitarian organizations, who feared that a sudden reduction in troops could lead to the withdrawal of United Nations agencies and NGOs in anticipation, or as a result, of heightened insecurity.

15. The Special Mission recommends that any further reductions beyond that described on paragraph 12 above should be carefully decided and take into account evolving circumstances. My Special Representative and the Force Commander stressed that a troop level of approximately 15,000 represents the critical minimum below which the mandated tasks of UNOSOM II could not be achieved. The Special Mission is of the view that the Force should not be subjected to any hasty and large-scale reduction, which could destabilize security conditions in Somalia. In this connection, it argues that a clear distinction should be made between a planned, phased reduction and a sudden, substantial cut in the troop strength. The plan prepared by the Force Commander for the gradual reduction of the forces culminating in the scheduled completion of the mission by March 1995 indicates that the level of 15,000 could be achieved by the end of October or during November 1994.

16. However, if substantial progress is achieved in the political process of national reconciliation, resulting in a markedly improved security environment, accelerated reductions in the troop level could be considered. An important consideration would remain that such reductions not affect the security of substantive and support personnel, both civilian and military, and troop levels should be adequate for the tasks entrusted to UNOSOM II. Should the Council

decide to extend the mandate of UNOSOM II beyond March 1995, the phases in the planned reduction of troop levels would be adjusted accordingly.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

17. The humanitarian and national reconciliation efforts of the United Nations in Somalia are being undertaken in conditions of exceptional complexity. Despite considerable difficulties, the United Nations response has had a significant effect in addressing emergency relief and humanitarian assistance requirements, which were the original and primary priorities for the involvement of the international community in Somalia. Unfortunately, progress in national reconciliation and in bringing about security and stability, particularly in Mogadishu, has not kept pace with the achievements in the humanitarian area. The inordinate delay in implementation of agreements that the Somali factions have negotiated and endorsed, particularly in Addis Ababa and Nairobi, has continued to raise grave misgivings about the seriousness of their commitment to peace and national reconciliation.

18. The response of the international community ought to have shifted long ago from emergency relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes. However, such efforts have been hampered by the slow progress in achieving political reconciliation and by a progressive deterioration of the security situation. The prospects for post-emergency recovery and rehabilitation also appear limited as a result of the lack of donor interest in the absence of tangible progress towards a political solution.

19. It is, however, too early to conclude that UNOSOM II cannot achieve the objectives for which it was established, although the omens do not appear promising. UNOSOM II continues to provide essential support and assistance to the humanitarian effort as well as to the police, judicial and penal programmes in Somalia. The Force also secures key ports, airports and installations and provides protection for United Nations and NGO personnel, as well as their material assets.

20. If, as a result of a rapprochement between the Hawiye sub-clans, national reconciliation can be achieved and an interim government established by the end of 1994, there would be just enough time to complete UNOSOM II's mandate by 31 March 1995. In such welcome circumstances, there might even be a case for extending the Mission, including the Force, for some months, though not necessarily at its present strength.

21. If, on the other hand, no significant progress has been made by the end of September 1994, particularly with respect to the Hawiye conference, the Security Council will have to decide how much longer it wishes to maintain a 15,000-strong Force just to provide some degree of protection to humanitarian operations and to United Nations and other international personnel. There would also be a need to take account of the readiness of troop-contributing countries to maintain their contingents in those circumstances.

22. It is apparent that the end of September 1994 will be a crucial period for both the national reconciliation process and the continued involvement of the

United Nations in Somalia. In addition to the prospects of Hawiye reconciliation, the ongoing contest for the leadership of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), the dominant faction in the north-east region, is expected to be resolved. There should also be a clearer indication about the extent to which the recently concluded Lower Juba and Absame conferences are facilitating national reconciliation and the degree to which the political alliances made during those conferences will endure. In addition, the outcome of the various attempts that have been made to bring the Somali National Movement (SNM) of the north-west into the reconciliation process will also be known.

23. However, there are also disturbing developments which seem to militate against national reconciliation. The two antagonistic groups, the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), are continuing to encourage and facilitate the creation of new partisan factions, which are not parties to the agreements reached in Addis Ababa and Nairobi. This multiplication of factions will complicate further the prospects for the preparatory meeting and the subsequent national reconciliation conference and must be overcome without further delay.

24. It was thought at one time that the other segments of society, particularly the elders, could play a central role in the formation of a Somali Government. Given the fact that the factions were not effectively disarmed by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) or by UNOSOM II, it has proved extremely difficult to marginalize them and they now often operate with the blessing of the elders. Despite these difficulties, it would seem that the prudent approach would be the one that is under way, i.e., the reconciliation of factions in the framework of the traditional structures, including in particular the initiative undertaken by the Imam of Hirab to reconcile the Hawiye.

25. Certain members of the Security Council, as well as many troop contributing countries, have conveyed to me in clear terms that they are not prepared to continue indefinitely their costly commitments, particularly when there are no encouraging signs of the Somali leader's readiness to assume responsibility for the proper governance of their own country on the basis of a durable national reconciliation. Similar views have been expressed by Member States with regard to the civilian police (CIVIPOL) programme. Some of them have informed me of their intention to withdraw their personnel from that programme. It is my hope that the Somali leaders concerned will realize that the nature and duration of international support to Somalia depend very much on their own resolve to achieve political compromise. The Security Council may wish to address a direct message to the principal Somali leaders to remind them that the future of their country lies in their hands.

26. In the light of the foregoing and after a careful review of the reports submitted to me by my Special Representative and the Special Mission, I have come to the conclusion that the United Nations should continue for a little longer to give the Somali leaders the opportunity to demonstrate that they are ready to cooperate with the United Nations and with each other in order to bring their country back from the abyss. I accordingly recommend that:

(a) UNOSOM II should make every effort to facilitate the convening of a Hawiye conference by the end of September 1994;

(b) The Force Commander should take immediate steps to reduce the Force level by 1,500, as recommended by the Special Mission, and thereafter bring it down to 15,000 all ranks as soon as possible;

(c) In the light of the progress made towards national reconciliation up to the end of September 1994, I should report to the Security Council, by 15 October 1994 at the latest, on the future of UNOSOM II;

(d) The Security Council consider approving, now or later, a one-month extension of the UNOSOM II mandate until 31 October 1994, to allow time for study of, and action on, the report I will submit to it by 15 October;

(e) In the interim, contingency plans for the full range of options referred to in subparagraph (c) above should be elaborated and refined.

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17 August 1994

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LETTER DATED 5 AUGUST 1994 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to resolution 845 (1993) of 18 June 1993 concerning the difference between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, by which, inter alia, the Council requested me to keep it informed on the progress of further efforts under my auspices.

Since my last report on 27 May 1994 (S/1994/632), Mr. Cyrus Vance has continued his mission of good offices. The parallel talks which Mr. Vance had intended to pursue on or about 13 June were unavoidably delayed for reasons which were outside the control of either of the parties. Mr. Vance met between 10 and 13 July with a delegation from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia headed by Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski. He met between 11 and 13 July with a delegation from the Hellenic Republic led by Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias.

Mr. Vance's discussions concentrated on the principal difference of substance between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - the name. Various proposals that had been previously advanced, as well as a number of new ideas, were reviewed thoroughly with each party. The delegation of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia noted the requirements of their electoral calendar, and both parties agreed to resume discussions with Mr. Vance in the autumn.

I met Foreign Minister Papoulias on 12 July and Foreign Minister Crvenkovski on 13 July. I emphasized to each of them my concern that the parties reach an early agreement on a solution to the difference between them. Both Ministers confirmed their Government's desire to continue with the discussions under my auspices and expressly stated their strong preference that Mr. Vance continue his mission of good offices.

I shall continue to keep the Council informed.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

94-33196 (E) 170894 17/08/94

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17 August 1994

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LETTER DATED 17 AUGUST 1994 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The members of the Security Council have considered your letter of 5 August 1994 pursuant to resolution 845 (1993) concerning the difference between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The members of the Council have asked me to convey to you their continuing appreciation for your efforts and those of your Special Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance. They note that at the latest round of discussions both parties thoroughly reviewed a number of proposals addressing the principal difference of substance, the name.

The members of the Council expressed some concern that, in spite of several rounds of discussions between the parties following the adoption of resolution 845 (1993) on 18 June 1993, the principal difference of substance - the name - remains unresolved. They were also concerned at the possible consequences that continuation of the current situation might have for the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. They fully shared the views you expressed on 12 and 13 July to the Foreign Ministers of Greece and of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia that the parties reach an early agreement on a solution to the difference between them.

The members of the Council welcome both parties' desire to continue with discussions under your auspices, and their commitment to resume those discussions with Mr. Vance this autumn. They call upon both parties to cooperate fully with you and Mr. Vance in order to reach agreement on outstanding issues as soon as possible.

(Signed) Yuliy M. VORONTSOV
President of the Security Council

94-33207 (E) 170894 17/08/94

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17 August 1994
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IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 16 AUGUST 1994 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA ADDRESSED RESPECTIVELY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

With reference to the letter dated 19 July 1994 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq contained in document S/1994/843 and concerning allegations by Iraq of warplanes taking off from the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait and perpetrating provocative acts, we wish to inform you that the Governments of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait officially deny these allegations, which are entirely unfounded.

We should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nasser AL-SABEEH
Chargé d'affaires
Permanent Mission of the State of
Kuwait to the United Nations

(Signed) Gaafar ALLAGANY
Ambassador
Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia to the United Nations

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S/1994/980*
19 August 1994
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IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 16 AUGUST 1994 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA ADDRESSED RESPECTIVELY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

With reference to the letter dated 18 July 1994 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq contained in document S/1994/854 and concerning allegations by Iraq of warplanes taking off from the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait and perpetrating provocative acts, we wish to inform you that the Governments of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait officially deny these allegations, which are entirely unfounded.

We should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nasser AL-SABEEH
Chargé d'affaires
Permanent Mission of the State of
Kuwait to the United Nations

(Signed) Gaafar ALLAGANY
Ambassador
Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia to the United Nations

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* Reissued for technical reasons.

94-33863 (E) 230894 23/08/94

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S/1994/981
18 August 1994

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LETTER DATED 18 AUGUST 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon the instructions of my Government, I would like to clarify a recent matter that has been a source of confusion in the deliberations of the Security Council.

The 8 June 1994 and 12 July 1994 cease-fire agreement has expired without being renewed. In fact, our Government was not asked to renew this agreement because the cease-fire was perceived to be productive only to the extent that there was also simultaneous positive movement on the negotiating front.

The Republic and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina accepted the Contact Group's peace plan. The Karadzic forces have rejected the plan, and have demanded terms and conditions that are totally inconsistent with the territorial, constitutional and human rights standards envisioned by the Contact Group's plan. The Karadzic forces, in fact, have effectively proposed the status quo as their basis for a political settlement and therefore would favour a freezing of the current situation.

The Government and the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina are undertaking measures entirely consistent with the terms and spirit of the Contact Group's peace plan. Any attempts to cite the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, explicitly or implicitly, as violating a cease-fire: (a) are factually incorrect because there is no longer a cease-fire agreement in place; (b) the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not involved in any offensive or provocative actions, nor can it be accused of such activities, when it acts to defend our civilians or the Republic's sovereignty and territorial integrity; (c) would favour the freezing of the current situation on the battlefield while there is no progress on the negotiating table; and (d) would seem at least unwittingly to support the Karadzic forces' terms for negotiations by favouring the status quo indefinitely and while negating the Contact Group's peace plan.

The Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina could not be blamed for interpreting any Security Council statements that are inconsistent with the Contact Group peace plan and associated course of action as being a rejection of that peace plan and consequent course of action. This would be

especially tragic and indefensible since four members of the Contact Group are also permanent members of the Security Council.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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S/1994/982
18 August 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 AUGUST 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Following the letter of the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, of 10 August 1994, addressed to you (S/1994/960), and my previous letter of 13 August 1994 (S/1994/969), I regretfully have to inform you of yet another attack by the Serbian paramilitary forces from the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, directed at the Dubrovnik airport at Cilipi.

Today between 0600 and 0700 hours local time, several artillery shells hit the airport from the direction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of which damaged the runway, impacting on its centre (GR BN 750150). This is yet another in the most recent series of acts of aggression against the Republic of Croatia conducted recently by the Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces (Herzegovina Corps), that started several weeks ago. The present situation poses a threat to the security and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, and may have unforeseen consequences for the ongoing peace process and stability for the wider region.

It is the opinion of my Government that it would be helpful if the members of the Security Council were to address the issue as a matter of urgency, in order to issue a stern warning to the Bosnian Serbs that such acts cannot and will not be tolerated by the Council. My Government kindly requests the assistance of the Security Council in this matter.

I would request the distribution of the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladimir DROBNJAK
Chargé d'affaires, a.i.

94-33379 (E) 180894 18/08/94

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S/1994/983
21 August 1994

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LETTER DATED 18 AUGUST 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit the English translation of a note verbale dated 20 July 1994 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq at Tehran (see annex).

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Note verbale dated 20 July 1994 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq at Tehran

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Tehran and has the honour to inform the latter of the following:

The judicial authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran have issued the arrest warrant No. 30/73/11/356 for Mr. Majid Esfandiari, who has been charged with bombing, murdering the Rev. Iraj (Tatabous) Mikaelian and the Rev. Mehdi Dibaj, as well as being an accomplice in the murder of Bishop Haik Hovspian-Mehr. After committing these terrorist acts and while carrying arms, Mr. Esfandiari and his companion injured Mr. Mohammad Yazdani, an Iranian citizen, and crossed the border in the Mehran area of Ilam province and fled to Iraq.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, once again, strongly protests the presence of the terrorist organization of Monafeqin (which calls itself the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran) in the territory of Iraq and considers the support provided by the Government of Iraq for that organization as blatant interference in the internal affairs of Iran and holds Iraq fully responsible for the criminal acts of this terrorist organization.

In accordance with the above-mentioned arrest warrant, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran calls upon the Government of the Republic of Iraq to take urgent measures to arrest Mr. Majid Esfandiari and extradite him to Iran on the basis of principles governing bilateral relations and respect for the national sovereignty of States, and in the light of the expressed commitment by the Government of Iraq to the same.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran hopes that the Government of the Republic of Iraq would thus give practical effect to its belief in good-neighbourly relations, lessening tension in bilateral relations and respect for the rules and principles of international law.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/984
22 August 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 AUGUST 1994 FROM THE ACTING PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the attention of the Security Council, the following information on the third special session of the Governing Council, held on 12 August 1994 at Geneva.

At its 44th plenary meeting, the Governing Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, appointed Mr. Rafael Rivas-Posada as Commissioner for the panel for claims in category A, filling the post left vacant after the death of Mr. José María Ruda. At the same meeting, the Council also decided that Mr. Kamal Hossain should be the panel's chairman.

The text of the letter from the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Commission to the Acting President of the Governing Council enclosing the curriculum vitae of Mr. Rivas-Posada is attached herewith (see annex).

(Signed) Gilberto Vergne SABOIA
Acting President
Governing Council
United Nations Compensation Commission

Annex

Letter dated 9 August 1994 from the Deputy Executive Secretary of the United Nations Compensation Commission addressed to the Acting President of the Governing Council regarding the nomination of a Commissioner for the Panel dealing with claims in category A*

On behalf of the Secretary-General, I have the honour to transmit the nomination of Mr. Rafael Rivas-Posada, from Colombia, as a candidate to fill the vacancy left by the death of Mr. José María Ruda in the Panel of Commissioners for claims in category A.

Enclosed is the curriculum vitae of Mr. Rivas-Posada, who has already submitted a disclosure statement in accordance with article 22 of the Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure (S/AC.26/1992/10).

In view of the new composition of this Panel of Commissioners, I propose that Mr. Kamal Hossain should be its chairman.

(Signed) Felipe PAOLILLO
Deputy Executive Secretary

* Originally issued as S/AC.26/S-3/R.2.

Enclosure

Rafael Rivas-Posada

Curriculum vitae

Nationality: Colombian.

Born on 5 April 1932.

Doctor in Law and Political Science, School of Law, National University, Bogota (1954).

Ph.D. and Masters Degree in Political Science, Princeton University (1968).

Professor of Public Administration and Political Science, School of Public Administration, Bogota (1963-1965).

Professor of Political Science, Universidad de los Andes, Bogota (1970-1975).

Ambassador, Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York (1975-1976).

Ambassador to Belgium and to the European Communities (1989).

Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Geneva (1989-1991).

Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the study of human rights in Uruguay (1982-1985) and Cuba (1991-1992).

Member of the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (1988-1992).

Minister of Education, Bogota (1977-1978).

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/985
23 August 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 AUGUST 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ALBANIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to present to you the attached letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Albania, Dr. Alfred Serreqi, dated 22 August 1994.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Pellumb KULLA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 22 August 1994 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Albania addressed to the President of the Security Council

I would like to draw your attention to the deep concern of the Government of Albania in connection with a new Greek provocative act in the interior along the border between Albania and Greece.

At 0607 hours, on 21 August 1994, a Greek propeller aircraft, which had taken off from the Corfu, violated the airspace of the Republic of Albania and, before departing, dropped leaflets, imprinted with the Greek flag, which called for the overthrow of the existing order in Albania.

The Government of Albania considers the 21 August 1994 event a very grave provocation against the sovereignty and integrity of the Albanian State, which openly runs counter to the most elementary norms regulating relations between sovereign States, to the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of the Helsinki Act and other international documents. It regards it as a premeditated provocation and stresses that leaflets, with the Greek flag imprinted, which called for the overthrow of the existing order in Albania, are clear evidence of its aim.

I would like to emphasize that this is not the only act. It follows in the wake of the Greek side's repeated provocations, which culminated in the tragic event on 10 April 1994, when a Greek commando infiltrated Albanian territory and perpetrated a terrorist act, killing two Albanian army men. Having perpetrated the crime, the Greek commando went back to Greek territory. Likewise, on 7 July 1994, two Greek soldiers penetrated about 800 metres deep into Albanian territory and, after opening fire on Albanian frontier guards, returned to Greek territory. Violations of Albanian territorial waters by Greek vessels have also been repeated. Recently, the Greek authorities have commenced violent collective expulsion of Albanian economic immigrants, which has been accompanied by casualties, such as the killing of an Albanian youth, Orman Hysen Gjoka (24 years old).

All of these acts have ensued from threatening statements made by Greek military authorities, which do not rule out the possibility of using military force against Albania.

To investigate the said events, the Government of Albania has made a proposal on setting up an impartial international commission and continuing dialogue to resolve all pending issues between the two countries, but the Greek side has rejected it.

The Government of Albania is convinced that the policy of pressures, blockades and provocations pursued by the Government of Greece and other institutions of the Greek State, is also materialized in territorial claims, embodied in the notion of "Vorio Epir", and in illegal attempts to Hellenize it. This comes to happen simultaneously with growing repression, violence and killing on the part of the Belgrade regime in Kosova, something which testifies

to a joint Serbian-Greek strategy to bring about a dangerous destabilization of the south of the Balkans, fraught with unforeseen consequences for the entire region, for which the Government of Greece bears responsibility.

I avail myself of this opportunity to request your condemnation of these provocative acts of the Greeks against the sovereignty and integrity of the Republic of Albania and the exercise of your authority to put an end to them.

(Signed) Alfred SERREQI

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/49/332
S/1994/986
23 August 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Item 151 of the provisional agenda*
THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES OF CROATIA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 22 August 1994 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Croatia to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention once again to the fact that the authorities of "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" are continuing to conduct themselves in a manner that would indicate that they are determined to establish a "Greater Serbia" that would include various parts of the Republic of Croatia. With that goal in mind they instigate and assist their local proxy authorities in the occupied territories of Croatia.

There is a clear intention of the Belgrade authorities to annex the occupied parts of the Republic of Croatia (United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) and "pink zones") to Serbia and Montenegro. Yet another example of this practice is the enclosed personal identification card issued in Belgrade, "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)", where the birthplace of the holder of the card is specified as "Berak, Vukovar, Republic of Serbian Krajina". It is well known that Vukovar lies in the Republic of Croatia, within the territory occupied by the Belgrade authorities and their proxies in the UNPAs. The Belgrade regime, however, continues to claim the existence of an illegal and self-proclaimed entity on Croatian territory. I would like to recall a similar issue that we have brought to the attention of the Security Council on 14 May 1993 (see S/25781).

With the same token, I have to draw your attention to document A/49/311 of 15 August 1994, where the Belgrade authorities once again refer to the so-called "Republic of Serbian Krajina", thus implying its legal status.

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* A/49/150.

May I ask for your kind assistance in distributing the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under item 151 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladimir DROBNJAK
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

ANNEX

Identification card



Description

Left: Historical coat of arms of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; underneath, inscription: "Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"; "Socialist Republic of Serbia".

Inscription: district - "City of Belgrade";
name - [erased];
family name - [erased];
name of one of the parents - [erased];
date of birth - [erased];
place of birth, district, republic - "Berak, Vukovar, Republic of Serbian Krajina";
blood group - [left blank];
serial number - [erased].

Right: Photograph (attached); seal overlapping the photograph, with coat of arms and inscription (illegible).

Inscription: personal identification number - [erased];
domicile - "Belgrade";
address - [erased];
term of validity - "10 years";
registration number - [erased];
date of issue - [erased] - (year) "1994";
signature - [illegible];
serial number - [erased].

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/987
23 August 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 AUGUST 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In addition to my previous letters (S/1994/960, S/1994/969 and S/1994/982) concerning the deteriorating situation at and around the Dubrovnik airport at Cilipi, I have to inform you of the recent developments.

Yesterday evening, at 2045 hours local time, two 155-mm howitzer shells impacted in the vicinity of the village of Mocici, only 200 metres to the south of the airport runway. There was no immediate damage. Today, at 2015 hours local time, yet another howitzer shell was fired from the direction of Bosnian Serb paramilitary positions on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that impacted approximately 300 metres from the sea, in the immediate vicinity of the runway. The first incident has been inspected by the United Nations Military Observer and European Community monitoring mission teams in Dubrovnik.

By the same token, I should like to express the concern of my Government with regard to the frequent artillery provocations by the Bosnian Serb paramilitary units in the vicinity of Zupanja in the Slavonia region of Croatia.

I have to emphasize that my Government considers the present situation as a threat to the security and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia. The ongoing peace process and stability in the wider region may be jeopardized if this series of events is allowed to continue unabated. On behalf of my Government I should like to reiterate the request for the assistance of the Security Council in this matter.

I would request the distribution of the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladimir DROBNJAK
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

94-33876 (E) 230894 23/08/94

UNITED
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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

~~A/49/334~~
S/1994/988
24 August 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Item 45 of the provisional agenda*
QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
(MALVINAS)

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 23 August 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the protest note, dated 22 August 1994, from the Government of the Argentine Republic, rejecting the unilateral measure taken by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland extending its alleged maritime jurisdiction in the waters adjacent to the Malvinas.

I request that this note and its annex be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 45 of the provisional agenda of the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly entitled "Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)", and of the Security Council, and drawn to the attention of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

(Signed) Emilio J. CARDENAS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/49/150.

94-33889 (E) 240894 240894 25/08/94

Annex

Text of the note dated 22 August 1994 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship to the Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and refers to the unilateral British decision to extend its alleged jurisdiction over the maritime space west of and adjacent to the area described in the annex to the Joint Declaration of 28 November 1990.

The Argentine Government registers its most serious protest and rejection of that measure which involves maritime spaces adjacent to Argentine national territory, and does not accept the attempt to extend the dispute over sovereignty to an undisputed area.

In the maritime space in which the United Kingdom seeks to extend its alleged jurisdiction, the Argentine Republic has exercised, exercises and will continue to exercise sovereign rights, particularly in respect of the administration and control of fishing activities.

The British action implies a departure from the Joint Declaration and the bilateral understandings reached from 1990 until now regarding the south-west Atlantic.

Furthermore, the action of the United Kingdom disregards the General Assembly resolutions which call on the parties to the dispute to find a solution to the dispute regarding sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich islands by means of negotiations and which call upon the two parties "to refrain from taking decisions that would imply introducing unilateral modifications in the situation" (General Assembly resolution 31/49 of 1976).

The Argentine Government reserves the right to raise the question of the grave situation deriving from the measure adopted by the British Government in the competent international forums, particularly the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Without prejudice thereto, and in exercise of its jurisdiction over the said area, the Argentine Government will continue to administer and exploit the living marine resources in that zone, and to monitor and control the activities carried out therein, for the better conservation of the resources.

Furthermore, the Argentine Government considers that unilateral decisions of this nature interfere with the maintenance and possible deepening of the bilateral understandings on fishing, with negative consequences for the conservation of the living marine resources in the south-west Atlantic.

Consequently, the Argentine Government calls on the British Government to refrain from putting the measure into effect and from any unilateral act in the area in question so as to permit continuation of the fruitful cooperation achieved thus far.